Range convexity and ambiguity averse preferences by Paolo Ghirardato & Massimo Marinacci
Economic Theory 17, 599–617 (2001)
Range convexity and ambiguity averse preferences 
Paolo Ghirardato1 and Massimo Marinacci2
1 Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, CA 91125, USA (e-mail paolo@hss.caltech.edu)
2 Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata, Universit` a di Torino, Piazza Arbarello 8,
10122 Torino, ITALY (e-mail massimo@econ.unito.it)
Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: April 17, 2000
Summary. We show that range convexity of beliefs, a ‘technical’ condition that
appears naturally in axiomatizations of preferences in a Savage-like framework,
imposes some unexpected restrictions when modelling ambiguity averse pref-
erences. That is, when it is added to a mild condition, range convexity makes
the preferences collapse to subjective expected utility as soon as they satisfy
structural conditions that are typically used to characterize ambiguity aversion.
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Introduction
The mathematical representations of preferences that we obtain in decision-
theoretic models typically enjoy both ‘empirically relevant’ and ‘technical’ prop-
erties. Separability is an obvious example of a property belonging to the former
group, while continuity of preferences, or monotone continuity for probabilities
belong to the latter.1 Technical properties are thus named because, taken in isola-
tion, they have small or null empirical content. But it is not correct to then infer
that they are harmless. For, when joined with empirically relevant properties,
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1 A probability satisﬁes monotone continuity if for every increasing sequence of events {An}∞
n=1
converging to A = ∪nAn, P(An) converges to P(A).600 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
technical conditions may substantially alter their empirical content. For instance,
it is well known that for probabilities, monotone continuity modiﬁes the empiri-
cal content of ﬁnite additivity, as most eloquently stressed by de Finetti [5] and
Savage [19]. Analogously, Krantz et al. [14, Sect. 9.1] and Wakker [21] observe
that continuity adds signiﬁcant empirical content to (coordinatewise) separability
in problems of additive conjoint measurement. Another technical property that
is commonly used is ‘range convexity’ (see Section 1 for a deﬁnition) of the
function representing the decision maker’s beliefs, that we call her willingness to
bet. Such property follows naturally in axiomatizations that rely on Savage’s [19]
rich state space construction. In this paper we show that also range convexity is
less harmless than usually thought.
We argue that range convexity of the willingness to bet imposes surprisingly
strong restrictions for preferences which reﬂect ambiguity aversion, the attitude
displayed by the subjects in the famous thought experiment of Ellsberg [7] (and
in many others that followed). Roughly, we show that if a decision maker’s
willingness to bet satisﬁes a range convexity assumption and a very mild condi-
tion then if her preferences are ambiguity averse (in the sense of Ghirardato and
Marinacci [8]), they are very close to satisfying the subjective expected utility
(SEU) model. Indeed, if her willingness to bet is also convex (a condition typi-
cally associated with ambiguity aversion), then her preferences do satisfy SEU.
The mild condition — which we show to be compatible with the presence of
substantial ambiguity aversion — is the following: There exists one nontrivial
event A such that for every event B which is less (resp. equally) ‘likely’ than A,
the complement Bc is more (resp. equally) ‘likely’ than Ac. That is, when bet-
ting on that speciﬁc event, the decision maker behaves as if she had probabilistic
beliefs, but she is otherwise unconstrained.
These results hold for a very general class of preferences (the biseparable
preferences introduced in Ghirardato and Marinacci [10]) which includes the
two most popular decision models with ambiguity aversion, the Choquet ex-
pected utility (CEU) model of Schmeidler [20], and the maxmin expected utility
(MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [13]. In particular, they apply to the ax-
iomatizations of CEU preferences in a purely subjective framework of Sarin and
Wakker [17] and Gilboa [11], which describe decision makers whose willingness
to bet satisﬁes some range convexity conditions.
To show that range convexity is the driving force behind the mentioned
results, we also look at ambiguity averse preferences in the setting of Anscombe
and Aumann [1], as exempliﬁed by the models of Schmeidler [20] and Gilboa
and Schmeidler [13]. We show that similar results can be proved, but only by
making the mild condition in the previous results much stronger and much less
plausible.
The conclusion that we draw from this exercise is that one should exert
caution in assuming range convexity of beliefs, as the latter adds substantial
empirical content to seemingly weak (empirically relevant) conditions. For the
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that range convexity may deprive CEU and MEU preferences of their predictive
edge over SEU.2
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 introduces the required deﬁnitions
and a key result. In Section 2 we warm up by showing a straightforward con-
sequence of range convexity for CEU preferences like those described by Sarin
and Wakker [17]. Sections 3 and 4 contain the main results in a Savage setting.
Section 5 concludes by showing that the results lose their bite in the Anscombe-
Aumann setting. The Appendices contain some basic deﬁnitions (capacities and
Choquet integrals), a review of the CEU and MEU models, and all the proofs.
1 Preliminaries and notation
1.1 Decision settings
The two decision settings that we use in the paper are the one developed by
Anscombe and Aumann [1] and the one developed by Savage [19].
In the simpler Savage setting, the objects of choice are ‘acts’, delivering a
consequence for each state of the world. More precisely, there is a state space
(S,Σ), where Σ is a σ-algebra of subsets of S, and a set X of consequences
(alternatively, prizes), equipped with a σ-algebra U containing all the singletons.
The set of acts F is the class of all the simple (i.e., ﬁnite-ranged) measurable
functions from S into X . As customary, we abuse notation and identify x ∈ X
with the constant act yielding x for every state s ∈ S.
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, the objects of choice are also state-
contingent acts, but the consequences are (objective) lotteries on the set of prizes
X . More precisely, let P be the set of all the simple probability measures on
the σ-algebra U.3 The set of acts is the set F of all the simple measurable
functions from S into P . As customary, we abuse notation and identify the ele-
ments x ∈ X with the degenerate lotteries in P . Similarly, we use p to denote
the constant act mapping every state s ∈ S into the same point p ∈ P .4
For any pair p,q ∈ P (in particular a pair of sure prizes in X ) and an
event A ∈ Σ, we denote by pAqthe binary act which yields p if A obtains and
q otherwise, and by p αq the lottery that yields p with probability α and q with
probability (1 − α).
2 Clearly, the axiomatic models which build instead on a rich outcome space — e.g., the CEU
models of Wakker [22], Nakamura [15] and Chew and Karni [3], the MEU model of Casadesus-
Masanell et al. [2], or the mentioned models in the Anscombe-Aumann setting — do not have such
problem.
3 Throughout the paper, probability measures are ﬁnitely additive capacities (see Appendix A for
a deﬁnition).
4 We stick here to the traditional interpretation of the elements of P as lotteries. Of course
the Anscombe-Aumann framework is consistent with any consequence space having a vector space
structure (for instance, it could be a convex subset of Rn, where we interpret consequences as bundles
of goods).602 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
1.2 Preference models
In general, we assume that a decision maker’s choice behavior is described by
a weak order (a complete and transitive binary relation)  on F , and   and
∼ respectively denote the asymmetric and symmetric component of . A weak
order  is nontrivial if there are x,x ∈ X such that x   x. For any nontrivial
weak order , we say that an event A ∈ Σ is essential for  if x   xAx  x,
for some x   x.
To deﬁne the basic preference model that we use in the paper we need to
introduce some terminology and notation. As customary, a representation of 
is a function V : F → R such that for all f ,g∈ F ,
f  g ⇐⇒ V (f ) ≥ V (g). (1)
A representation V is monotonic if V (f ) ≥ V (g) whenever f ,g ∈ F are such
that f (s)  g(s) for all s ∈ S. We can now deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 1 Let  be a binary relation on F . We say that a representation
V : F → R of  is canonical if it is monotonic and there is a set-function ρV :
Σ → [0,1] such that, if we let u(x) ≡ V (x) for all x ∈ X, for all consequences
x  y and all A ∈ Σ we have:
V (xAy)=u(x)ρV(A)+u(y)(1− ρV(A)). (2)
A relation  on F is called a biseparable ordering if it admits a canonical
representation that, if  has at least one essential event, is unique up to a positive
afﬁne transformation.
Given a biseparable ordering , we call u its canonical utility index. Suppose
that  is also nontrivial. It is easy to see that ρV is independent of the speciﬁc
canonical representation V — so that we can denote it ρ — and that because
of the monotonicity of V , ρ is a capacity (see Appendix A for a deﬁnition).
Moreover, for any x,x ∈ X such that x   x, deﬁne the ‘likelihood’ relation
∗ on Σ as follows:5 For every A,B ∈ Σ, let
A ∗ B ⇐⇒ xAx xBx. (3)
That is, A ∗ B iff the decision maker prefers to bet ‘on’ A rather than to bet ‘on’
B (with the same payoffs). By deﬁnition, A ∗ B iff ρ(A) ≥ ρ(B). Therefore,
we call ρ the decision maker’s willingness to bet.
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, we use a slightly smaller class of prefer-
ences, as we assume that they are also linear on the set P of the lotteries on
the ﬁnal prizes X .
5 For biseparable orderings, the choice of x and x are inconsequential for ∗, since these
preferences satisfy a payoff independence condition (Savage’s P4 axiom).Range convexity and ambiguity aversion 603
Deﬁnition 2 Let  be a binary relation on the set F in an Anscombe-Aumann
setting. We say that  is a constant linear (shortly, c-linear) biseparable ordering
if  has a canonical representation V which also satisﬁes the following property
(called constant linearity): For every p,q ∈ P and every α ∈ [0,1],
V (p αq)=αV (p)+( 1− α)V (q). (4)
Since it basically only restricts the decision maker’s choices among bets
(binary acts), the class of biseparable (or c-linear biseparable) orderings is very
large, and it contains most of the decision models with state-independent utility
that have been studied by decision theorists.6 In particular, it contains CEU (hence
SEU) and α-MEU orderings.7
1.3 Ambiguity aversion
In [8], we propose a behavioral notion of absolute ambiguity aversion, and we
show that for biseparable preferences it is quite generally characterized as follows.
Let ∆ be the set of all the probability measures on (S,Σ) and
D () ≡
 
P ∈ ∆ :
 
S
u(f (s))P(ds) ≥ V (f ) for all f ∈ F
 
.
A biseparable ordering  is ambiguity averse iff D () / = ∅. In light of this
result, here we deﬁne ambiguity aversion as having D () / = ∅. In particular,
this implies that a CEU ordering with capacity ρ is ambiguity averse if and only
if Core(ρ) / = ∅, i.e., ρ is balanced. In fact, in such a case D ()=Core(ρ). In
the case of a MEU ordering with set of priors C , D ()=C . Hence all MEU
orderings are ambiguity averse, whereas all 0-MEU orderings are ambiguity
loving. Schmeidler [20] proposes a stronger property of ambiguity aversion in
the Anscombe-Aumann setting. In the CEU case such property is characterized
by convexity of ρ. MEU (resp. 0-MEU) orderings are ambiguity averse (resp.
loving) also in this stronger sense.
In [8], we also propose a behavioral notion of unambiguous event, and we
show that the set of unambiguous events of an ambiguity averse (or loving) bisep-
arable preference is characterized as follows: A is unambiguous for a preference
 with willingness to bet ρ iff
A ∈ Π() ≡{ B ∈ Σ : ρ(A)+ρ(Ac)=1 }.
Again, this result applies in particular to CEU and MEU preferences, where ρ
respectively represents the beliefs and lower envelope of the set of priors (see
Eq. (17) in App. B).
6 An axiomatic characterization of (c-linear) biseparable orderings in both settings is presented
in [10].
7 See Appendix B for the deﬁnitions. Here we just remark that by α-MEU we mean those
orderings which are given by α times the minimum expected utility plus (1−α) times the maximum
expected utility. As customary, we call a 1-MEU ordering just a MEU ordering.604 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
1.4 Range convexity and a useful result
A capacity ρ is convex-ranged on Λ ⊆ Σ if for every A ∈ Λ and x ∈ [0,ρ(A)],
y ∈ [ρ(A),1] there exist B,C ∈ Λ with B ⊆ A ⊆ C, such that ρ(B)=x and
ρ(C)=y.8 In particular, when Λ = Σ we just say that ρ is convex-ranged.
Remark 1. When ρ is a probability measure, range convexity as deﬁned above is
equivalent to the following notion: For every A ∈ Σ and every α ∈ [0,ρ(A)],
there is B ∈ Σ such that B ⊆ A and ρ(B)=α. However, the equivalence fails for
general capacities, as the following example (suggested to us by Itzhak Gilboa)
illustrates: Let S =[ 0 ,1] ∪ [2,3], and λ be the Lebesgue measure. Deﬁne a
capacity ρ as follows: For every A ⊆ S, write A = A1 ∪A2, where A1 = A∩[0,1]
and A2 = A ∩ [2,3], and let
ρ(A)=



(λ(A1)+λ(A2))/2 A1 / = ∅, A2 / = ∅,
λ(A1)/4 A2 = ∅,
λ(A2)/4 A1 = ∅.
It is easy to see that for every 0 <α<ρ (A) there exists B ⊆ A such that
ρ(B)=α. However, consider A =[ 0 ,1]: ρ(A)=1 /4, but there is no set C ⊇ A
such that ρ(C)=1 /3.
The following result about the uniqueness of probability measures in the
presence of range convexity is proved in [9, Theorem 1], where we study its
consequences for SEU preferences.
Lemma 1 Let P1 and P2 be probability measures on (S,Σ), with P1 convex-
ranged. Suppose that there is A ∈ Σ such that Pi(A) ∈ (0,1) for i =1 ,2, and
such that for all B ∈ Σ,
P1(A)=P1(B) ⇐⇒ P2(A)=P2(B). (5)
Then P1 = P2.
2 Prologue: Complement symmetry
Consider a nontrivial CEU ordering  on F . As mentioned above, the capacity
ρ is a numerical representation of the decision maker’s ‘likelihood’ relation ∗
on Σ. Consider now the alternative ‘likelihood’ relation ∗ deﬁned by
A ∗ B ⇐⇒ xB c x  xA c x. (6)
That is, A ∗ B if the decision maker prefers betting ‘against’ B to betting against
A.I fρ is a probability measure (i.e.,  is a SEU preference), then ∗=∗. That
is, one obtains an identical likelihood relation if instead of considering bets ‘on’
events, one considers bets ‘against’ events. However, this is not necessarily true
if ρ is not additive (as observed, for example, by Gilboa [12]).
8 This notion is weaker than the one commonly used in the literature (e.g., Gilboa [11, p. 69]).Range convexity and ambiguity aversion 605
In a comment on Sarin and Wakker [17]’s axiomatization of CEU orderings
in a Savage setting, Nehring [16] argues that Sarin and Wakker’s interpretation
of one of their axioms (P4) is compelling only for those CEU preferences  for
which ∗=∗. This is tantamount to imposing the following condition, that he
dubs ‘complement symmetry’ (CS): For all A,B ∈ Σ,
xAx xBx⇐⇒ xB c x  xA c x. (7)
Nehring claims (p. 936) that “[...] a CEU preference that is representable by
a capacity ρ is complement symmetric if and only if ρ is symmetric [...]”,9 a
restrictive class of capacities that, as Nehring observes (loc. cit.), “rules out all
Ellsberg-type phenomena”, and hence is of limited practical interest.
This claim is not generally true: The following example shows that there
are CEU preferences which are complement symmetric, but do not induce a
symmetric capacity.
Example 1. On an arbitrary state space (S,Σ), given a probability measure P on
Σ and constant 0 < k < 1, consider the capacity ˆ ρ deﬁned as follows: For every
A ∈ Σ,
ˆ ρ(A) =
 
kP(A) A / = S
1 A = S.
A CEU ordering represented by ˆ ρ is complement symmetric, but ˆ ρ is not sym-
metric. For another example, consider the rank-dependent EU (RDEU) orderings,
CEU orderings whose capacity ρ is a ‘distortion’ of a probability measure (that
is, ρ = g(P) for g :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] strictly increasing and such that g( 0 )=0
and g(1) = 1). Any RDEU ordering is easily seen to be complement symmetric.
However, its capacity ρ may not be symmetric (one only needs that there be
some α ∈ [0,1] for which g(α) / =1− g(1 − α)).
However, Nehring’s claim that CS implies symmetry is true for a subset of the
CEU orderings, to which the orderings axiomatized by Sarin and Wakker [17]
also belong: The ones whose capacity is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class
of events containing S and closed w.r.t. complements.10 Indeed, we will presently
show that for CEU orderings in this class, Nehring’s claim can be considerably
strengthened: a preference is ambiguity averse and satisﬁes a weakening of CS
only if it is SEU. The weaker version of CS is the following:
Deﬁnition 3 We say that a nontrivial weak order satisﬁes weak complement sym-
metry (WCS) if for every A,B ∈ Σ,
xAx∼ xBx⇐⇒ xB c x ∼ xA c x. (8)
Condition (8) can be reworded as follows: Given A ∈ Σ, let [A] denote the
‘likelihood indifference class’ passing through A; that is, using ∼∗ to denote the
9 That is, for every A ∈ Σ, ρ(A)+ρ(Ac) = 1 (see Appendix A).
10 Sarin and Wakker’s axiomatization implies that there is a sub-σ-algebra Σua of Σ on which
the capacity ρ is convex-ranged and additive.606 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
symmetric component of ∗,[ A] ≡{ B ∈ Σ : B ∼∗ A}. Then Eq. (8) says that
for every A ∈ Σ, B ∈ [A] if and only if Bc ∈ [Ac].
We can now state the announced result:
Proposition 1 Consider a nontrivial CEU ordering  represented by a capacity
ρ, which is convex-ranged on a class Λ ⊆ Σ containing S and closed with respect
to complements. Then:
(i)  satisﬁes WCS if and only if it satisﬁes CS;
(ii)  satisﬁes WCS and it induces a ρ symmetric on Λ if and only if ρ is
symmetric (on Σ);
(iii)  satisﬁes WCS and it induces a ρ balanced and symmetric on Λ if and only
if  is a SEU ordering.
It will be observed that the capacity ˆ ρ used in the example above is not
convex-ranged. Also, we remark a corollary to the proposition: Consider a RDEU
preference satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 1, whose willingness to bet
is represented by a distortion ρ = g(P), as described above. Then  is ambiguity
averse in the sense of [8] if and only if it is a SEU ordering. This is due to the
fact that any such  satisﬁes CS, as observed above. To be fair, the condition
that ρ is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class Λ implies that g must satisfy
the following condition for all α ∈ (0,1): g(α)=1 −g(1−α) (i.e., g is symmetric
around the diagonal). This seems to us quite restrictive.
However, it is possible to use Lemma 1 to show the following more interest-
ing result about RDEU orderings. Suppose that a capacity ρ = g(P) for a convex-
ranged P, and that there is just one α ∈ (0,1) such that g(α)=1− g(1 − α).
Then if ρ is exact (that is, it is equal to the lower envelope of its core), it is equal
to P. This implies that any RDEU ordering whose g and P (and g(P)) satisfy
the conditions listed above is a SEU ordering.
3 A complement symmetric event
An obvious objection to Proposition 1 is that CS is too strong a property to require
of ambiguity averse preferences. Indeed, requiring complement symmetry robs
them of one of their most interesting features (see also Sarin and Wakker [18]). In
fact, it is quite clear that the presence of ambiguity might make one’s evaluation
of bets on different events depend on whether one stands to win or to lose
contingently on those events: If the decision maker perceives more ambiguity
about event B than about A, he might well prefer the bet on A over the bet on B,
and the bet on Ac over the bet on Bc. This is exactly what complement symmetry
rules out.11 Because of point (i) of Proposition 1, under range convexity, WCS
is subject to similar criticism.
11 Looking in particular at the case of the RDEU orderings discussed at the end of the previous
section, we observe that most authors consider RDEU preferences to be ambiguity neutral, one of
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However, we now show that, thanks to Lemma 1, in the presence of range
convexity it is possible to obtain similarly strong conclusions even if CS only
holds for a single event. The following deﬁnition formalizes our main require-
ment.
Deﬁnition 4 Given a nontrivial weak order , we say that an event A ∈ Σ is
complement symmetric if for all B ∈ Σ and some x   x,
xAx  xBx =⇒ xB c x   xA c x (9)
xAx∼ xBx =⇒ xB c x ∼ xA c x. (10)
In words, an essential event A is complement symmetric if the decision maker
prefers (resp. is indifferent) betting ‘on’ A over betting ‘on’ B, then he prefers
(resp. is indifferent) betting ‘against’ B over betting ‘against’ A.
We assume that our preference has (at least) one essential and complement
symmetric event. This is signiﬁcantly weaker than CS, that requires that all events
be complement symmetric. Moreover, notice that here the symmetry of betting
behavior is required only ‘below’ A. That is, we do not require that B  ∗ A
imply Ac  ∗ Bc.
It is important to stress that we do not attach any normative value to the
existence of an essential complement symmetric event. Our perspective is com-
pletely positive. Indeed, we remark that this condition is extremely weak, and,
differently from CS, it is compatible with high levels of ambiguity aversion. The
following example illustrates this point:
Example 2 Consider the classical Ellsberg 3-color urn, containing 30 red balls
and 60 blue or yellow balls. The state space of the possible ball extractions is
S = {r,b,y}. Consider a CEU decision maker with beliefs represented by the
capacity ρ deﬁned as follows: ρ(r)=1 /3, ρ(b,y)=2 /3, ρ(b)=ρ(y)=1 /6
and ρ(r,y)=ρ(r,b)=1 /2. This is clearly an ambiguity averse decision maker,
displaying the preferences traditionally observed in this problem. If we consider
A = {b} and B = ∅ we see that his preference does not satisfy CS. However,
A = {r} is an essential complement symmetric event for these beliefs.
To acquire anyway a better feel of the interpretation of this assumption,
observe that the capacity ρ(A) can be conceptually seen as the synthesis of two
different types of considerations: One is a ‘pure likelihood’ judgement on the
plausibility of A happening, the other is an ‘ambiguity’ factor, that modiﬁes the
pure likelihood judgement to take into account the ambiguity perceived about A.
Assuming, as it seems reasonable, that the ambiguity perceived about A is the
same as that perceived about Ac, the number ρ(A)/ρ(Ac) is then an estimate of
the ‘pure’ odds associated with A. Then, A is an essential complement symmetric
event if ρ(A) >ρ (B) (resp. ρ(A)=ρ(B)) implies
ρ(A)
ρ(Ac)
>
ρ(B)
ρ(Bc)
 
resp.
ρ(A)
ρ(Ac)
=
ρ(B)
ρ(Bc)
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That is, all the events which are as likely as A have identical ‘pure’ odds, and
all those which are less likely than A have lower ‘pure’ odds.
In the main result of this section we show that under the assumptions on the
willingness to bet ρ used in Proposition 1, additivity of the willingness to bet ρ
almost follows from the assumption made above.
Theorem 1 Consider a nontrivial biseparable ordering  whose willingness to
bet ρ is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class Λ ⊆ Σ containing S and closed
under complementation. Then:
(i) If  has an essential complement symmetric event, then Core(ρ) is at most a
singleton;
(ii)  has an essential complement symmetric event and ρ is exact if and only if
ρ is additive.
Thus, when there is an essential complement symmetric event, the willingness
to bet can at most have one probability measure P in its core. Moreover, if it is
also exact, then ρ must coincide with such P (which exists, since exact capacities
are balanced). In particular, this will be the case if, as is often assumed, ρ is
convex.
Theorem 1 does not yet enable us to conclude that the preference in question
must be a SEU ordering. Indeed, in [8] we show that there are biseparable order-
ings whose ρ is a probability measure which are strictly ambiguity averse, hence
non-SEU. However, more can be said if we limit our attention to a subset of the
biseparable preferences that contains both the CEU and MEU models as partic-
ular cases. These are the biseparable  such that their canonical representation
V satisﬁes the following condition: For all f ∈ F ,
V (f ) ≥
 
S
u(f (s))ρ(ds), (11)
where ρ is the willingness to bet associated with V , and the integral is taken in
the sense of Choquet. We then obtain:
Corollary 1 Consider a relation  satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. Sup-
pose moreover that  is ambiguity averse, it satisﬁes (11) and it has an exact ρ.
Then  has an essential complement symmetric event if and only if  has a SEU
representation.
Remark 2. The assumptions that  is ambiguity averse and it satisﬁes (11) are
only used in the corollary to guarantee that  is SEU whenever ρ is additive.
Thus, the same result can be obtained for any class of biseparable orderings with
the latter property.
We now apply this corollary to CEU and MEU preferences to obtain the
following immediate:
Corollary 2 Consider a nontrivial biseparable ordering  whose willingness to
bet ρ is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class Λ ⊆ Σ containing S and closed
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(i)  is a CEU ordering with exact ρ and an essential complement symmetric
event if and only if  is a SEU ordering;
(ii)  is a MEU ordering with an essential complement symmetric event if and
only if  is a SEU ordering.
This result shows that the range convexity of ρ, rather than CS or WCS, is
what drives the strong conclusions we obtain in Theorem 1. Even in the presence
of the signiﬁcantly milder condition that there be a single essential complement
symmetric event, range convexity reduces MEU preferences to SEU, and it almost
reduces ambiguity averse CEU preferences to SEU (the exception being those
ambiguity averse CEU preferences whose ρ is balanced but not exact).
In particular, Corollary 2 allows us to reformulate Nehring’s critique of the
axiomatization of Sarin and Wakker [17] as follows: The range convexity of
beliefs that plays such a crucial role in that axiomatization makes the scope of the
preferences they describe fairly narrow. Differently from Nehring, what motivates
this point is not the fact that the interpretation of the axioms may implicitly be
based on the validity of CS. Rather, our motivation is the observation that the
existence of a complement symmetric event is a very mild condition which
is likely to be often satisﬁed. Clearly, a similar critique could be made of an
axiomatization of MEU preferences constructed along the same lines as Sarin
and Wakker [17], since that would likely yield a ρ satisfying the conditions of
Corollary 2.
4 Without symmetry on Λ
One could of course raise doubts about the role that the symmetry of ρ on Λ plays
in the results in the previous section. For example, it is material to obtaining the
symmetry of ρ on Σ in Theorem 1. We now show that similar conclusions can
be obtained even if there is no class Λ on which ρ is symmetric.
We reinforce range convexity by assuming that it holds over the whole Σ,
and we add the requirement that the essential complement symmetric event A
be also unambiguous (i.e., A ∈ Π()). For example, event A in Example 2 also
satisﬁes this stronger condition. We then obtain the following result for the CEU
case:
Proposition 2 Consider a nontrivial CEU ordering  whose willingness to bet
ρ is convex and convex-ranged. Then  has an essential, complement symmetric
and unambiguous event if and only if  is a SEU ordering.
This result shows that the CEU axiomatization of Gilboa [11] has a similar
limitation as Sarin and Wakker’s: Because of the range convexity of ρ, the
existence of an unambiguous complement symmetric event and a little structure
on the preferences, are tantamount to satisfying all Savage’s axioms.
Similarly to what we did for earlier results, Proposition 2 can be proved
more generally for biseparable orderings; we have only stated the CEU version
because we deem it to be the most interesting one. (For instance, the condition610 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
that ρ is convex-ranged on Σ seems too strong for MEU preferences, where
ρ = P.) However, there is another result that symmetrically seems to be more
interesting for α-MEU orderings than for CEU orderings, even though it could
also be generalized to biseparable preferences (assuming ambiguity aversion and
using D () in place of C ).
Proposition 3 Consider a nontrivial α-MEU ordering  such that α/ =1 /2 and
at least one P ∈ C is convex-ranged. Then  has an essential, complement
symmetric and unambiguous event if and only if  is a SEU ordering.
Remark 3. The proposition is false if α =1 /2. In fact, it is easy to see that for any
such preference Π()=Σ, and every event is complement symmetric. Hence,
the assumptions have no bite. This does imply that a 1/2-MEU preference is
ambiguity averse iff ρ is additive (see Lemma 2 in Appendix C). However, ρ
could be additive without  being SEU.
While no axiomatizations of MEU (or α-MEU) preferences with this range
convexity property are available, it seems fairly likely that any axiomatization
which uses a rich-state framework would deliver at least one P ∈ C convex-
ranged. Proposition 3 shows that such axiomatization would be narrowly more
general than Savage’s.
5 Range convexity and the Anscombe-Aumann setting
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, the range convexity of the decision maker’s
beliefs is implicitly built into the framework, by assuming that all the simple
lotteries on X are available. It is therefore natural to conjecture that results
similar to those presented in the previous two sections could be proved for c-
linear biseparable preferences, in particular for the CEU and MEU models of
Schmeidler [20] and Gilboa and Schmeidler [13].12 However, that conjecture is
easily disproved by looking at the following extension of Example 2.
Example 3. Consider the Ellsberg urn described in Example 2, and imagine that
an independent randomizing device (a ‘roulette wheel’) is available, which can
be used to make simple lotteries on X as payoffs. In this Anscombe-Aumann
setting, consider a CEU ordering  whose beliefs are given by the capacity ρ in
Example 2. As explained there,  does have an essential complement symmetric
event, and ρ is convex. But  is clearly not a SEU ordering.
The reason for the failure of Proposition 2 in this example is that the capacity
ρ is not convex-ranged on Σ. One could of course argue that the decision maker’s
beliefs in an Anscombe-Aumann setting are really described by ρ and by her
beliefs on the behavior of the randomizing device, i.e., on the ‘roulette wheel’
events. An ‘event’ is then a product of an event in Σ and an event on the
12 This is what happens in the SEU case, where the same results that hold in the Savage setting
(with convex-ranged beliefs) hold in the Anscombe-Aumann setting (see our [9]).Range convexity and ambiguity aversion 611
roulette wheel. However, in such a case the notion of complement symmetric
event becomes more demanding than in Savage’s setting. At the very least, we
need an ‘event’ which satisﬁes the following condition:
Deﬁnition 5 Given a nontrivial weak order in an Anscombe-Aumann setting, we
say that it has an essential fully complement symmetric ‘event’ if there are x,x ∈
X such that x   x and α ∈ (0,1) such that, for every B ∈ Σ and every
β,β  ∈ [0,1],
x αx ∼ [(x β x)Bx]= ⇒ [(x (1 − β)x)B x] ∼ x (1 − α)x (12)
x αx ∼ [xB(x β  x)] =⇒ [x B (x (1 − β )x)] ∼ x (1 − α)x. (13)
The two conditions correspond to Eq. (10) in Deﬁnition 4, and they say that
there is some α such that all ‘events’ of probability α have complements which
are equally likely. Since the set of ‘events’ is very rich, they are signiﬁcantly
more demanding than requiring the existence of an A ∈ Σ which satisﬁes (10).
For example, the preference  in Example 3 does not have an essential fully
complement symmetric ‘event’.13
However, we do have the following result:
Proposition 4 Consider a nontrivial c-linear biseparable ordering (in an
Anscombe-Aumann setting)  with willingness to bet ρ. Then  has an essential
fully complement symmetric ‘event’ if and only if ρ is symmetric. If, in addition,
ρ is balanced, then it is additive.
Proceeding as in Section 3, we immediately obtain the consequences for CEU
and MEU orderings:
Corollary 3 Consider a nontrivial c-linear biseparable ordering  with whose
willingness to bet ρ. Then the following hold:
(i)  is an ambiguity averse CEU ordering with an essential fully complement
symmetric ‘event’ if and only if  is a SEU ordering;
(ii)  is a MEU ordering with an essential fully complement symmetric ‘event’
if and only if  is a SEU ordering.
This result applies to the CEU model of Schmeidler [20] and to the MEU model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler [13]. However, we do not think that it raises any
serious concerns as to the possibility of those models of generally describing
ambiguity averse decision makers. The reason is that, as hinted above, in this
setting the existence of a fully complement symmetric ‘event’ does not seem
as mild an assumption as the existence of a complement symmetric A ∈ Σ in
the Savage setting. What magniﬁed the power of the latter assumption in the
results in the previous sections were the additional range convexity assumptions,
which are naturally provided by certain axiomatic structures. In contrast, the
existence of a fully complement symmetric ‘event’ incorporates the consequences
13 For instance, it is easy to see that taking α =1 /3 does not work: Take B = {r,y} and β =2 /3.612 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
of range convexity that are needed for the results (and this is why it does not
need additional range convexity assumptions). This difference makes it a much
less plausible assumption from a descriptive point of view.
Appendix
A Capacities and Choquet integrals
A capacity on (S,Σ) is a set-function ρ : Σ → [0,1] which is monotonic (i.e.,
A ⊆ B implies ρ(A) ≤ ρ(B)) and normalized (i.e., ρ(∅)=0a n dρ(S) = 1). A
capacity that satisﬁes ﬁnite additivity (i.e., ρ(A∪B)=ρ(A)+ρ(B) for all disjoint
A,B ∈ Σ) is called a probability measure. The core of a capacity ρ : Σ → [0,1]
is the possibly empty set of all the probability measures that setwise dominate
ρ, that is,
Core(ρ) ≡{ P ∈ ∆ : P(A) ≥ ρ(A) for all A ∈ Σ}.
A capacity ρ is called balanced if Core(ρ) is nonempty; it is called exact if it is
balanced and ρ(A) = minP∈Core(ρ) P(A) for all A ∈ Σ; it is called convex if for
every A,B ∈ Σ,
ρ(A ∪ B) ≥ ρ(A)+ρ(B) − ρ(A ∩ B).
Convex capacities are exact, and exact capacities are balanced, but the converses
are not true.
Given a class Λ ⊆ Σ closed with respect to complements, a capacity ρ :
Σ → [0,1] is called symmetric on Λ if ρ(A)+ρ(Ac) = 1 for all A ∈ Λ. For
convenience, if Λ = Σ, we just say that ρ is symmetric.
The notion of integral used for capacities is that due to Choquet [4]. The
Choquet integral of a non-negative measurable function ϕ : S → R w.r.t. ρ is
deﬁned as follows:
 
S
ϕdρ =
  ∞
0
ρ({s ∈ S : ϕ(s) ≥ α})dα, (14)
where the integral is taken in the sense of Riemann (they are well-deﬁned because
ρ is monotone). When ρ is a probability measure, Choquet and Lebesgue integrals
are equal.
B CEU and MEU orderings
B.1 CEU orderings
In the Savage setting, a binary relation  on F is called a CEU ordering if
there exist a utility function u : X → R and a capacity ρ on Σ such that the
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respect to ρ (see Appendix A for the deﬁnitions). That is,  is represented by
V : F → R deﬁned as follows
V (f )=
 
S
u(f (s))ρ(ds). (15)
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting,  is a CEU ordering if the V functional
satisﬁes (15) and is also afﬁne on P . In either setting, a SEU ordering is a CEU
ordering whose ρ is a probability measure.
Clearly, a nontrivial CEU ordering is biseparable, with canonical representa-
tion given by V (Choquet integrals are easily seen to satisfy monotonicity). In
the Anscombe-Aumann setting, a CEU ordering is also c-linear biseparable.
B.2 α-MEU orderings
In the Savage setting, a binary relation  on F is called an α-MEU ordering if
the following hold: There are a utility function u : X → R, a (weak∗-) closed
and convex set of probabilities C on (S,Σ), and a coefﬁcient α ∈ [0,1] such
that  is represented by the functional V : F → R given by
V (f )=α min
P∈C
 
S
u(f (s))P(ds)+( 1− α) max
P∈C
 
S
u(f (s))P(ds). (16)
When α = 1, we call  a MEU ordering. In an Anscombe-Aumann setting, 
is an α-MEU ordering if the V functional satisﬁes (16) and is afﬁne on P .I n
either setting, a SEU ordering is a α-MEU ordering which has C = {P}.
A nontrivial α-MEU ordering is biseparable, with canonical representation
V , and
ρ(·)=αP(·)+( 1− α)P(·), (17)
where P(·) ≡ minP∈C P(·) and P(·) ≡ maxP∈C P(·). The set-function P is seen
to be an exact capacity. In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, a α-MEU ordering is
also c-linear biseparable.
C Proofs
The following easy lemma is used in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 4, and it
has some independent interest.
Lemma 2 A symmetric capacity ρ on (S,Σ) is balanced (i.e., Core(ρ) / = ∅) if
and only if it is a probability measure.
Proof. Let P ∈ Core(ρ). We have:
ρ(A) ≤ P (A) =1− P (Ac) ≤ 1 − ρ(Ac) = ρ(A)
so that ρ(A)=P(A) for all A ∈ Σ. This implies that ρ is additive.    614 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
Proof of Proposition 1. Item (i) is shown as follows. The only implication that
needs proof is that WCS implies CS. Hence, suppose that A  ∗ B. By the range
convexity of ρ on Λ (and the fact that S ∈ Λ) we have that there is C ∈ Λ such
that C ∼∗ A (which, by WCS, implies Ac ∼∗ Bc), so that, using the fact that ∗
is a weak order, we get C  ∗ B. Again by the range convexity assumption, we
can ﬁnd D ∈ Λ, D ⊆ C such that D ∼∗ B (again by WCS: Dc ∼∗ Bc). Hence
C  ∗ D. Since C c ⊆ Dc, monotonicity of ρ implies Dc ∗ C c, or, equivalently,
Bc ∗ Ac. If it were Bc ∼∗ Ac, WCS would imply A ∼∗ B, which is not the
case. Hence Bc  ∗ Ac, showing that CS holds.
We next prove (ii). From the fact that  is a CEU ordering represented by
ρ, and (8) we get that, for all A,B ∈ Σ
ρ(A)=ρ(B)= ⇒ ρ(Ac)=ρ(Bc).
In particular, since ρ is convex-ranged on Λ, there is some B0 ∈ Λ, such that
ρ(B0)=ρ(A), so that we obtain
ρ(A)+ρ(Ac)=ρ(B0)+ρ(Bc
0)=1 ,
where the last equality follows from the fact that ρ is symmetric on Λ. This
shows that ρ is symmetric on Σ.
As for (iii), it follows immediately from the fact that ρ is symmetric and
Lemma 2.    
Proof of Theorem 1. We start by proving (i). Employing the same argument used
in showing (ii) of Theorem 1, we see that for all B ∈ Σ,i fρ(B)=ρ(A) (where
A is the essential complement symmetric event), then ρ(B)+ρ(Bc) = 1. Letting
ρ(A)=α ∈ (0,1), we thus have that if P ∈ Core(ρ), then ρ(B)=P(B)=α.
Hence, for every B ∼∗ A, P(B)=α for all P ∈ Core(ρ).
We now show that, conversely, if for B ∈ Σ there is P ∈ Core(ρ) such
that P(B)=α, then B ∼∗ A. For every P ∈ Core(ρ) and every C ∈ Σ,
ρ(C) ≤ P(C) ≤ ¯ ρ(C) (where ¯ ρ is the complementary capacity of ρ deﬁned by:
for all C ∈ Σ,¯ ρ(C)=1−ρ(C c)). Hence ρ(B) ≤ α = ρ(A). If equality holds, we
are done. Otherwise, suppose that ρ(B) <α . By (9), ¯ ρ(B) < ¯ ρ(A)=α. But then
P(B) <α , and we get a contradiction.
We thus conclude that for every P ∈ Core(ρ) and every B ∈ Σ,
P(B)=α =⇒ ρ(B)=α. (18)
Since ρ is convex-ranged on Λ, we can ﬁnd a chain {Cβ}β∈[0,1] ⊆ Λ such
that ρ(Cβ)=β for all β ∈ [0,1]. Let Σ0 be the algebra generated by the chain
{Cβ}. We want to show that each P ∈ Core(ρ) is strongly continuous on Σ0.
That is, for every ε>0 one can ﬁnd a ﬁnite partition {Bi}n
i=1 of S such that
0 < P(Bi) ≤ ε for all i =1 ,...,n.
Let 0 <ε<1. There exists Cε ∈{ Cβ} such that P(Cε)=ε. Since ε<1,
P(C c
ε) > 0. If P(C c
ε) ≤ ε, we are done. Otherwise Σ0   C2ε \ Cε ⊆ C c
ε and
P(C2ε \ Cε)=ε. Since P(C c
ε) >ε , we have ε<1/2. Hence, P(C c
2ε) > 0. If
P(C c
2ε) ≤ ε, we are done. Otherwise A0   C3ε\C2ε ⊆ C c
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Proceeding in this way, we can construct a ﬁnite partition {Bi}n
i=1 ⊆ Σ0 such
that 0 < P(Bi) ≤ ε for all i, where n is the smallest positive integer such that
ε ≥ 1/n. This proves our claim that that each P ∈ Core(ρ) is strongly continuous
on Σ0. Since Σ0 ⊆ Σ, each P ∈ Core(ρ) is strongly continuous on Σ, hence
(by a classical result of Savage [19]) convex-ranged on Σ.
For all P,P  ∈ Core(ρ), (18) implies that, for all B ∈ Σ,
P (B) = α ⇐⇒ P  (B) = α.
By Lemma 1, we thus have P = P . This clearly implies that Core(ρ)={P}.
The proof of (ii) then follows immediately: If ρ is exact, then ρ = P.    
Proof of Corollary 1. From Theorem 1 it follows that ρ is additive, so that
Core(ρ)={ρ}. By ambiguity aversion D () / = ∅, and since it is immediate that
Core(ρ) ⊇ D (), we have that D ()={ρ}. Hence, using Eq. (11) we get that
for every f ∈ F  
S
u(f (s))ρ(ds)=V (f ),
which proves that  has a SEU representation with utility u and probability ρ.
The converse is immediate.    
Proof of Proposition 2. Since A ∈ Π(), (10) implies that if ρ(B)=ρ(A), then
ρ(B)+ρ(Bc) = 1. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1, to show that (18)
holds for every P ∈ Core(ρ) and every B ∈ Σ.
Also, since ρ is convex-ranged, we reason as in that proof to show that there
exists a chain {Cβ} such that ρ(Cβ)=β for all β ∈ [0,1]. As ρ is convex,
there exists a P ∈ Core(ρ) such that P(Cβ)=ρ(Cβ)=β for all β ∈ [0,1] (see
Delbaen [6]). Let Σ0 be the algebra generated by the chain {Cβ}. Yet again, we
follow the previous argument to show that P is strongly continuous on Σ0, and
so on Σ as well. Hence, P is convex-ranged on Σ. Hence, we know that every
measure in the core is convex-ranged, and that for all P,P  ∈ Core(ρ), we have
P (A) = α ⇐⇒ P  (A) = α
so that, again by Lemma 1, P = P . Hence, Core(ρ)={P}. Since ρ is convex,
ρ = P.    
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 3 Suppose that  is an α-MEU preference, with α/ =1 /2. Then for every
A ∈ Π(),
P(A)=P (A) for all P,P  ∈ C .
Proof. Using the deﬁnition of ρ in Eq. (17) and the fact that A ∈ Π(), we
obtain
αP(A)+( 1− α)P(A)+αP(Ac)+( 1− α)P(Ac)=1 .
If we now use the identity P(Ac)=1−P(A), we can rewrite the equation above
as follows:616 P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci
α(P(A) − P(A) )=( 1− α)(P(A) − P(A)).
When α/ =1 /2, this can only hold if P(A)=P(A), i.e., P(A)=P (A) for all
P,P  ∈ C , concluding the proof of the lemma.    
Proof of Proposition 3. Let A ∈ Π() be essential and complement symmetric,
and let γ = P(A)=P(A). Let P  ∈ C and B ∈ Σ be such that P (B)=γ.
Then P(B) ≤ γ. We show that, actually, P(B)=γ. Suppose not. Then, by (9),
P(Bc) > 1−γ, so that P(B) <γ , which contradicts P (B)=γ. Hence, P(B)=γ.
In turn, this and Eq. (10) implies minP(Bc)=1− γ, and so P(B)=γ for all
P ∈ C . Since P  was arbitrary, we conclude that for all B ∈ Σ, P(B)=γ if
and only if P(B)=γ for all P,P  ∈ C .
Consider now the convex-ranged measure P0 ∈ C . We have that for every
B ∈ Σ and every P ∈ C , P(B)=γ iff P0(B)=γ. Lemma 1 then shows that
P = P0, as wanted.    
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove the ‘only if’ of the ﬁrst statement, we rewrite
(12) and (13) in terms of the canonical representation V , having normalized u
so that u(x)=1a n du(x) = 0, and obtain:
ρ(B)β = α =⇒ βρ(Bc)+( 1− β)=1− α (19)
β  +( 1− β )ρ(B)=α =⇒ ρ(Bc)(1 − β )=1− α. (20)
Consider any B ∈ Σ. Suppose ﬁrst that ρ(B) ≥ α. Then there is β ∈ (0,1) such
that ρ(B)β = α. Applying (19) and summing the two equations together we get
1=( 1− β)+β(ρ(B)+ρ(Bc)),
which implies ρ(B)+ρ(Bc)=1 .
Suppose now that ρ(B) <α . Then we can ﬁnd β  ∈ (0,1) such that β +(1−
β )ρ(B)=α. Applying (20) and summing we thus obtain
1=β  +( 1− β )(ρ(B)+ρ(Bc)),
which again implies ρ(B)+ρ(Bc) = 1. The proof of the ‘if’ follows immediately.
As for the second statement, it is immediate from the ﬁrst one and Lemma 2.
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